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I. INTRODUCTION
Gary is interested in the open tax attorney position he saw posted
in the law firm’s kitchen.  Gary was recently approved to transfer to
an employment law position.  The firm’s transfer policy states that to
be eligible for a transfer, a lawyer must serve in his or her current
position for at least six months unless the two impacted directors, in
this case the tax and employment law directors, agree to an early
transfer.  Six days before Gary is scheduled to start working in the
employment law position, he approaches Sally, the tax department di-
rector, and tells her he is interested in the open tax position.  Sally
replies, “Gary, we are really looking to hire a woman for this position.”
Sally does not consider Gary’s qualifications and dismisses him solely
because of his gender.  Sally believes having more women in the tax
department will make the female clientele feel more secure.  How does
Gary respond?  Does he trudge ahead and apply anyway?  Does he beg
Sally and other members of the firm to reconsider?  Or does he walk
away, believing there is no point in applying?  Gary decides not to ap-
ply, understanding that only females will be considered, and brings
suit for gender discrimination under Title VII.
According to the Eighth Circuit, Gary is not entitled to relief be-
cause he failed to apply for the position.  Under Eighth Circuit prece-
dent, Gary did not suffer an adverse employment action because he
was not actually denied the position.  The Eighth Circuit’s precedent
does not support a conclusion that Sally’s statement meant the firm
systematically discriminated against men.  To prevail on his claim,
Gary would have to show he made every reasonable effort to convey
his interest in the position to the law firm, and Eighth Circuit prece-
dent indicates that he did not do so.  Gary does not understand what
was unreasonable about walking away after being told he would not
be hired because he is a man.  After EEOC v. Audrain Health Care,
Inc.,1 Gary is left with neither a remedy, nor an explanation.
This Note focuses on the narrow question of what the Eighth Cir-
cuit requires of plaintiffs in failure-to-apply cases, such as Gary’s, and
illustrates how the proper approach would have affected the outcome
in EEOC v. Audrain Health Care, Inc.  Part II of this Note provides a
legal background of Title VII and the genesis of the futile gesture doc-
trine as articulated by International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States.2  Additionally, Part II discusses EEOC v. Audrain
Health Care, Inc., including the factual background and the holding.
1. 756 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 2014).
2. 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977).
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Part III argues the Audrain Court: (a) erred in concluding the em-
ployer’s statement was not direct evidence; (b) wrongly implied addi-
tional elements for majority plaintiffs in this case, and; (c) provided a
free pass for the employer through rigid application of the McDonnell
Douglas framework.  Part III continues by exploring how the Eighth
Circuit’s new reasonable-ambitious standard turns thirty-seven-year-
old Supreme Court precedent on its head, as well as the consequences
that followed and which the Eighth Circuit could have avoided.  Fi-
nally, Part IV concludes that the Eighth Circuit’s perplexing approach
to failure-to-apply claims penalizes individual plaintiffs in disparate
treatment actions and gives the employer a free pass to avoid liability.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Proving Discrimination Generally Under Title VII
The goal of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 is to compen-
sate individuals who suffered as a result of an unlawful employment
practice.4  Most often, Title VII litigation involves disparate treatment
claims.5  When an employer makes an individual employment deci-
sion based on a protected trait, he or she engages in disparate treat-
ment.6  In a Title VII action, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2012).  The anti-discrimination provision provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
Id.  This provision is limited to discrimination in the employment context.
4. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998) (citing Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
5. Employment Section Overview, THE UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://
perma.unl.edu/WCX3-269U (last visited Apr. 12, 2015); see also Martha Chamal-
las, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 579, 599–600 (noting the significant
“conceptual” difference between disparate treatment and disparate impact “is
that disparate treatment requires proof of discriminatory intent or motivations,
while disparate impact reaches unintentional discrimination that stems from
neutral policies or practices that have a disproportionate adverse effect”).
6. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 (explaining the difference between dispa-
rate treatment and disparate impact); see also 1 BARBARA T. LINDEMANN ET AL.,
Disparate Treatment, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 2–2 to 2–28 (C. Geof-
frey Weirich et al. eds., 5th ed. 2012) (noting that in disparate treatment cases,
the employer simply treats some people less favorably because of their protected
class).
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establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.7  A plaintiff can
make his prima facie case of discrimination in one of two ways.
1. The Direct Evidence Route
First, “[t]he employee may produce direct evidence of discrimina-
tion, which is ‘evidence showing a specific link between the alleged
discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to sup-
port a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion
actually motivated the adverse employment action.’”8  Under the di-
rect evidence model, the question is “whether the [decision maker’s]
statements lead to the conclusion that the adverse action was taken
because of the person’s protected status without inference or presump-
tion.”9  No “magic words,” such as “because of,” are required to estab-
lish direct evidence.10
a. Mixed-Motives
When the plaintiff has direct evidence of discrimination, he or she
can proceed with a mixed-motives claim.11  In mixed-motive claims,
the plaintiff has evidence that a protected trait played a role in the
employer’s decision, but the employer also has legal justifications for
making its decision.12  In this situation, the fact finder does not have
to choose whether to believe the employer or plaintiff.  Instead, the
fact finder must determine what to do when both the legal and illegal
criterion motivated the employer’s decision.13  Because of the strength
of the plaintiff’s evidence, it is the defendant who bears the burden of
proving by “a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made
the same decision even if it had not taken the [protected characteris-
tic] into account.”14  Such a showing relieves an employer of liability
under Title VII.
7. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
8. McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sci., 559 F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 2009) (quot-
ing Russell v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 414 F.3d 863, 866 (8th Cir. 2005)).
9. EEOC v. Lehi Roller Mills Co., No. 2:08–CV–00591, 2014 WL 1757987, at *1 (D.
Utah May 1, 2014).
10. Id. at *1.
11. The Eighth Circuit interpreted “direct evidence” in the mixed-motive concept as
follows: “evidence of ‘conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision-
making process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discrimina-
tory attitude . . . sufficient to permit the factfinder to find that that attitude was
more likely than not a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.’”  Kriss v.
Sprint Commc’n Co., 58 F.3d 1276, 1282 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Radabaugh v.
Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 449 (8th Cir. 1993)).
12. Karen A. Haase, Mixed Metaphors: Model Civil Jury Instructions for Title VII
Disparate Treatment Claims, 76 NEB. L. REV. 900, 906–08 (1997).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 907.
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The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added § 2000e–2(m)15 to Title VII,
which provides: “[A]n unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”16
Under the Act, a mixed-motive plaintiff can recover declaratory relief,
injunctive relief, and attorney fees and costs, if the defendant was at
all motivated by the protected trait.17  The Eighth Circuit will only
allow a plaintiff to proceed with a mixed-motives claim if he or she has
direct evidence of discrimination.18  If the plaintiff does not have di-
rect evidence, he or she may create an inference of discrimination
through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.19
2. The McDonnell Douglas Framework
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must make a
prima facie showing by demonstrating the following: (1) the plaintiff is
a member of a protected class; (2) the plaintiff applied and was quali-
fied for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) de-
spite the plaintiff’s qualifications, the employer rejected the plaintiff;
and (4) after the plaintiff’s rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued to seek applicants from persons possessing
the plaintiff’s qualifications.20  If the plaintiff can establish a prima
facie case, the defendant then bears the burden of articulating a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory basis for the alleged adverse action.21 If the
defendant meets its burden, the plaintiff must show a genuine issue of
fact exists as to whether the defendant’s stated reason for the adverse
action is pretextual.22  Said otherwise, the plaintiff must prove that
his or her protected trait was the real reason for the employer’s ac-
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2012).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Rivers-Frison v. Se. Mo. Cmty. Treatment Ctr., 133 F.3d 616, 619 (8th
Cir. 1998); see also Kneibert v. Thomson Newspapers, Mich., Inc., 129 F.3d 444,
452 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding the plaintiff could not use the mixed-motives analysis
because he failed to present direct evidence in support of his age retaliation
claims).
19. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
20. Id. It is important to note the Court has stated the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work “is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement . . . [and] should not
be transposed into a rigid pleading standard for discrimination cases.”
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
21. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802–03; Hunter v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 697 F.3d 697, 702 (8th Cir. 2012).
22. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
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tion.23  It should be noted that the defendant in a pretext case at no
time has to prove he or she did not discriminate, only that there was a
nondiscriminatory reason for the decision.24
The third prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework requires
there be an adverse employment action.25  An adverse employment ac-
tion takes place when an employer’s actions sufficiently affect the em-
ployee’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.”26  Being denied the opportunity to compete for a posi-
tion constitutes an adverse employment action.27  However, in situa-
tions where it is not obvious that an employment decision resulted in a
significant change in benefits, an employee must demonstrate the de-
cision caused an “objectively tangible harm,” and is not merely
speculative.28
B. The Genesis of the Futile Gesture Doctrine
Historically, unless the applicant applied for the position, he or she
was not entitled to relief.  However, in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States,29 the Supreme Court held that even
nonapplicants are entitled to relief under Title VII if they can perform
the “difficult task”30 of establishing: (1) they were deterred from ap-
plying due to their unwillingness to “subject themselves to the humili-
ation of explicit and certain rejection”31 resulting from the employer’s
discriminatory practices; and (2) they would have applied had those
practices not existed.32
23. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508 (1993); Lidge-Myrtil v. Deere &
Co., 49 F.3d 1308 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding the plaintiff could not prove employer’s
failure to promote was pretextual and based on race).
24. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. 502.
25. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1) (2012).  Examples of adverse employment actions in-
clude “denying a position to an employee who meets the minimum compensation,
decreasing employee compensation or denying an employee a raise, or transfer-
ring an employee to a position of less responsibility or pay.”  Holland v. Washing-
ton Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Autumn George,
“Adverse Employment Action”—How Much Harm Must Be Shown to Sustain a
Claim of Discrimination Under Title VII?, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1075 (2009) (dis-
cussing what “adverse employment action” means and how much harm a plaintiff
must allege).
27. See Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
28. Russell v. Principi, 257 F.3d 815, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
29. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
30. Id. at 364.
31. Id. at 365.
32. Id. at 367–68. Teamsters established the futile gesture doctrine, which declares
that where there is a consistently enforced pattern or practice of discrimination,
failure to apply will not necessarily foreclose a plaintiff’s relief. Id. at 367.  How-
ever, it is “[o]nly in the rare case where an employer has essentially foreclosed
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Teamsters involved a case in which the government alleged the em-
ployer, T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., a trucking company, had engaged in a pat-
tern or practice of racial discrimination in hiring.33  The government
presented statistical evidence showing African-American and Latino
employees were limited to the lowest paying jobs at the company.34
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ holdings that the gov-
ernment carried its burden of proof because the government showed
racial discrimination “was the company’s standard operating proce-
dure—the regular rather than unusual practice.”35  The Court held
that the government established a prima facie case under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by showing that the employer engaged in
a pattern or practice of employment discrimination.36
Next, the Court discussed the question of individual relief for the
employer’s past discriminatory acts, a question that does not arise un-
til a policy of unlawful discrimination is proved.37  The discussion in-
volved an analysis of whether relief could be awarded to
nonapplicants, and the Court ultimately decided an employee’s failure
to formally apply for a job was not a per se bar to relief.38  The Court
observed that “[a] consistently enforced discriminatory policy can
surely deter job applications from those who are aware of it and are
unwilling to subject themselves to the humiliation of explicit and cer-
tain rejection.”39  As an illustration, the Court noted, “[i]f an employer
should announce his policy of discrimination by a sign reading ‘Whites
Only’ on the hiring-office door, his victims would not be limited to the
the interactive process through its policies or explicit actions [that] the futile ges-
ture doctrine [will] apply.”  Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1113 (10th Cir. 1999).
33. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 329.  The government alleged that the African-American
and Latino employees were given less desirable jobs and were subsequently dis-
criminated against in terms of promotions and transfers. Id.
34. Id. at 337; see also Christine Tsang, Uncovering Systematic Discrimination: Al-
lowing Individual Challenges to a “Pattern or Practice,” 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
319, 333 (2013) (“Approximately 80% of the African-American and Latino work-
ers held lower-paying jobs in operations and servicemen positions, as compared to
approximately 40% of the white employees.  Although the company workforce
was about 9% African-American and Latino, less than 1% of all line drivers were
African-American and Latino.  All of the African-American line drivers, with only
one exception, were hired after litigation had commenced.”).
35. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336–37.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 361.
38. Id. at 364 (noting that failure to apply for a position “is not an inexorable bar to
an award of retroactive seniority,” and that individual nonapplicants “must be
given an opportunity to undertake their difficult task of proving that they should
be treated as applicants and therefore are entitled to relief accordingly”).
39. Id. at 364.  The Court further explained, “[w]hen a person’s desire for a job is not
translated into a formal application solely because of his unwillingness to engage
in a futile gesture he is as much a victim of discrimination as is he who goes
through the motions of submitting an application.” Id. at 365–66.
200 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:193
few who ignored the sign and subjected themselves to personal
rebuff.”40
This decision marked the inception of the futile gesture doctrine for
pattern or practice discrimination cases.  Under this doctrine all of the
affected class members are presumptively entitled to relief once the
plaintiff establishes systematic discrimination.  The employer can
avoid liability only if it shows the individuals were not victims of the
employer’s discrimination.41
1. The Futile Gesture Doctrine—Some Things Never Change
The Supreme Court decided Teamsters in 1977, at which time
there was still significant resistance to the newly implemented Civil
Rights Acts of the 1960s.42  Today, one is unlikely to find situations of
“gross and pervasive” discrimination akin to that illustrated in Team-
sters.  Yet courts still apply Teamsters’ futile gesture doctrine in cases
where a plaintiff claims discrimination, but failed to formally apply for
the position.  Discrimination today typically takes on a much subtler
form.43  Because workplace discrimination is less obvious, it appears
that some courts are ill-equipped to deal with situations where em-
ployers make overtly discriminatory statements, possibly because bla-
tantly discriminatory statements are few and far between today.44
Recently, where the decision maker made an alarmingly blatant
discriminatory statement, the Teamsters precedent foreclosed relief
40. Id. at 365.
41. Id.; see generally The 1970s: The “Toothless Tiger” Gets Its Teeth—A New Era of
Enforcement, EEOC HISTORY: 35TH ANNIVERSARY, http://perma.unl.edu/9BJN-
VZTL (last visited Mar. 8, 2015) (describing the Teamsters decision as applied in
pattern-or-practice cases).
42. See Karen Anderson, LITTLE ROCK: RACE & RESISTANCE AT CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL
(2010) (detailing the desegregation crisis in Little Rock, Arkansas).
43. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (Winter,
2003) (describing the shift in the nature of discrimination from overt racism and
segregation to a much more subtle form, including inequalities in wages and
advancement).
44. See, e.g., EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 923–25 (11th Cir. 1990).
The Eleventh Circuit held the decision maker’s statement that if this were his
company he would not hire any black people constituted direct evidence of dis-
crimination in a failure-to-promote case, which shifted the burden of producing a
separate, racially-neutral reason for failing to promote the plaintiff to the em-
ployer. Id.  Here, the employer could not prevail in a mixed-motives case by offer-
ing a legitimate reason for its decision because the legitimate reason did not
motivate the employer at the time of the decision.  The employer did not know the
person he subsequently promoted was more qualified at the time the decision was
made because the more qualified person did not apply until after the employer
had determined the plaintiff was not qualified. Id.  Nonetheless, the court held in
favor of the employer because plaintiff had multiple instances of bad employee
conduct and attendance on his record. Id.
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for an employee who could not establish that his employer fostered an
atmosphere of “gross and pervasive” discrimination necessary to ex-
cuse his failure to formally apply.45  After EEOC v. Audrain Health
Care, Inc., to survive a summary judgment motion, absent “gross and
pervasive discrimination,” an employee would have to had applied for
the position, even after being told by the relevant decision maker that
he or she would not be hired.46
2. Failure-to-Apply Cases in the Eighth Circuit
In the Eighth Circuit, where the employer has a formal application
process, “an employee’s failure to formally apply for a position bar[s]
her from establishing a prima facie case.”47  There are two excep-
tions.48  First, “plaintiffs need not prove they formally applied for a
position if they allege facts which, if proven, would be sufficient to es-
tablish that application was futile due to defendants’ discriminatory
practices.”49  The second exception exists where “the plaintiff made
every reasonable attempt to convey his interest in the job to the em-
ployer.”50  However, the court in Chambers v. Wynne School District
suggested that merely conveying interest in the job to the employer is
not, by itself, enough to satisfy the second exception.51  Instead, it will
only suffice if the open position “was not officially posted or advertised
and either: (1) the plaintiff had no knowledge of the job from other
sources until it was filled, or (2) the employer was aware of the plain-
tiff’s interest in the job notwithstanding the plaintiff’s failure to make
a formal application.”52
Although the Eighth Circuit explicitly delineated two exceptions in
failure-to-apply cases, in Audrain, the court suggested a plaintiff
could still prevail on a discrimination claim if he or she made “every
reasonable effort” to convey interest in the position to the employer.
The Audrain Court did not apply the first exception because the
plaintiff failed to prove the employer’s pattern or practice was discrim-
inatory against men.  Thus, the plaintiff could not establish submit-
45. EEOC v. Audrain Health Care, Inc., 756 F.3d 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 2014).
46. Id.  “Gross and pervasive” discrimination implies systematic discrimination
against an entire class, such as that seen in International Brotherhood of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367 (1997).
47. Braziel v. Loram Maint. of Way, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1083, 1100 (D. Minn. 1996)
(citing Chambers v. Wynne Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d 1214, 1217 (8th Cir. 1990)).
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Winbush v. State by Glenwood State Hosp., 66 F.3d 1471, 1481 (8th
Cir. 1995)).
50. Id. (quoting Chambers, 909 F.2d at 1217).
51. EEOC v. Midwest Div.–RMC, LLC, No. 04–00883–CV–W–REL., 2006 WL
6508508, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 17, 2006) (citing Chambers, 909 F.2d at 1217).
52. Chambers, 909 F.2d at 1217 (citing EEOC v. Metal Serv. Co., 892 F.2d 341,
348–49 (3d Cir. 1990); Paxton v. Union Nat’l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 568 (8th Cir.
1982)).
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ting his application would have been futile under the Teamsters
precedent.  Neither did the Audrain Court apply the second exception
because the position at issue was advertised, and therefore whether
the plaintiff made every reasonable attempt to convey his interest to
the employer was a moot point.53  Yet, the Eighth Circuit suggested
the plaintiff could have prevailed on his discrimination claim if he had
made every reasonable effort to convey his interest to the employer,
thus seemingly propagating a third exception.54  The court further
muddied the waters by implying actual application is the only real
way to meet the “every reasonable effort” standard of the third
exception.55
C. EEOC v. Audrain Health Care, Inc.
1. Facts
In Audrain, the EEOC brought an action against Audrain Health
Care, Inc. (Audrain), alleging that Audrain violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 196456 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 199157
by refusing to consider transferring David Lunceford to a vacant oper-
ating room nurse position on the basis of his gender.58
Lunceford had worked as a nurse at Audrain since 2004 in several
different departments.59  Audrain allowed nurses to transfer between
units and posted vacancies to inform current employees of opportuni-
ties to apply for transfer.60  According to company policy, to be eligible
for transfer, an employee must serve in his or her current position for
at least six months unless the two impacted department directors
agree to an early transfer.61  To apply for a transfer, interested em-
ployees are required to fill out a “Request to Transfer” form.62
In March 2010, Audrain posted two job vacancies for nursing posi-
tions: a vacancy in the Operating Room (OR), and a vacancy in the
53. Id. at 1217.
54. EEOC v. Audrain Health Care, Inc., 756 F.3d 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 2014).
55. Id.  If actual application is the only way to excuse applying, then this is not an
exception to the requirement that the plaintiff apply.  This circular argument
does nothing but couch the requirement to apply in obscure terms.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2012).
58. EEOC v. Audrain Health Care, Inc., No. 2:11–CV–57, 2013 WL 317311, at *2
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 28, 2013), aff’d, 756 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 2014).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.  The impacted department directors are the director of the department to
which the employee wants to transfer and the director of the department from
which the employee would be transferred. Id.
62. Id.  Upon completing the transfer request, the Human Resources Department
would review the employee’s personnel file for qualifications and performance is-
sues to determine eligibility. Id.
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Critical Care Unit (CCU).63  Lunceford, who at the time was working
in the Post Anesthesia Care Unit (PACU), completed a transfer re-
quest form from PACU to CCU.64  Lunceford successfully transferred
to the CCU and was scheduled to start on April 22, 2010.65  On April
16, 2010, before his scheduled start date in the CCU, Lunceford asked
Brooks, the clinical coordinator of PACU and the OR, if she would con-
sider him or train him for the OR position.66  Lunceford did not have
any OR experience and was not qualified for the position without fur-
ther training.67  Brooks told Lunceford she “wanted to fill the position
with a woman” because she wanted to have the right mix of patients to
staff based on gender.68  According to Lunceford, Brooks stated, “I
hate to discriminate against you because you’re a man, but the doctors
want more female nurses in the OR.”69  Further, Brooks admitted she
would not hire a man, regardless of his qualifications.70  Lunceford
reported this conversation to Audrain’s Vice President of Clinical Ser-
vices and Chief Nursing Officer, and stated he no longer wanted to
work for Brooks.71
Lunceford never filled out a “Request for Transfer” form for the OR
position.72  In July, Audrain filled the OR position with a female
nurse.73
The EEOC brought action against Audrain, alleging the company
discriminated against Lunceford on the basis of his gender by failing
to consider him for transfer.74  Audrain moved for summary judg-
ment, arguing it did not discriminate against Lunceford because he
did not apply for the position and was not eligible or qualified for it.75
The district court concluded that the EEOC failed to establish di-
rect evidence of discrimination76 because Lunceford never completed a
63. Id.
64. Id. at *3.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at *10, Audrain Health Care, Inc., 756 F.3d 1083
(No. 13–1720), 2013 WL 3293757, at *I.
69. Id. at *9.
70. Id. at *14.
71. Audrain Health Care, Inc., 2013 WL 317311, at *3.
72. Id.
73. Id.  Prior to Lunceford’s inquiry, a female nurse with no OR experience applied
for the position, but was not considered because of her lack of experience. Id.
“Employees cannot be considered for an exception to the transfer policy without
first completing a Request for Transfer.” Id. at *2.
74. Id. at *1.
75. Id.
76. Id. at *5 (“It cannot be disputed that Brooks’s remark that she wanted to hire a
woman for the position indicates a discriminatory bias to hire a woman for the
OR nurse position instead of a man.  It is also undisputed that this remark in-
volved a decision-maker discussing the vacant job at issue.  None of the EEOC’s
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Request for Transfer, and therefore there was no adverse employment
action because Audrain never actually made the decision to deny him
the position.77  In addition, the court held that the EEOC failed to
establish an inference of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas
framework.78  The district court was not persuaded by the EEOC’s ar-
gument that Lunceford was excused from applying because he took
“extraordinary” steps to express his interest in the position.79  The
court noted that in addition to not applying, Lunceford also conveyed
to Audrain’s Vice President of Clinical Services that he no longer
wanted to work for Brooks at all.80  The district court granted
Audrain’s summary judgment motion.81  The EEOC appealed.82
2. The Eighth Circuit Weighs In
The Eighth Circuit refused to revisit the district court’s findings
regarding direct evidence or inference of discrimination, and instead
focused its analysis on the question of whether Lunceford suffered an
adverse employment action.83  The EEOC argued that a jury could
find Lunceford’s failure to apply was excused because Brooks’ com-
ment that she wanted to fill the vacant position with a woman made it
clear applying for the position would be futile.84  The EEOC relied on
language from the Supreme Court’s decision in International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. United States, in which the Court stated that
“[v]ictims of gross and pervasive discrimination could be denied relief
precisely because the unlawful practices had been so successful as to-
proof, however, establishes a direct link between the decision to hire someone
else for the vacant OR nurse position and Brooks’ remark.”).
77. Id. In its brief, the EEOC made the argument that there was in fact an adverse
employment action because Brooks refused to consider Lunceford or any other
man for the OR position, and admitted that this refusal was based on gender, not
qualifications.  This denied men the employment opportunity to even compete for
the job on the basis of gender.  Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 68, at
*22.
78. Audrain Health Care, Inc., 2013 WL 317311, at *5 (stating Lunceford failed to
meet the second prong of the burden-shifting analysis since “Lunceford did not
apply for the vacant OR nurse position.  Audrain could not hire Lunceford for a
job that he did not apply for”).
79. Id. at *6 (reasoning Audrain never rejected his application because Lunceford did
not apply, and further noting Lunceford was not qualified or eligible to apply for
the OR position).
80. Id.
81. Id. at *7.
82. EEOC v. Audrain Health Care, Inc., 756 F.3d 1083, 1084 (8th Cir. 2014).
83. Id. at 1087.
84. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 68, at *31–32.  The EEOC argued that
Brooks’ statement that she would not hire any man regardless of qualifications
amounted to a pattern or practice of discrimination as illustrated by Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367–68 (1977).
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tally to deter job applications from members of [a protected class].”85
Said differently, the EEOC argued that men, as a class, were deterred
from applying for this position because of the decision maker’s com-
ment that men would not be considered.
The Eighth Circuit found the EEOC had failed to establish that
Audrain fostered an atmosphere of “gross and pervasive discrimina-
tion” comparable to the discrimination at issue in Teamsters.86  The
court stated, “Teamsters involved a class action and may be inapplica-
ble to the present case because such analysis ‘is usually applied to
other class actions, rather than to actions brought by individual plain-
tiffs.’ ”87  The court explained, “[i]n any event, this court has reiterated
that an employee who does not formally apply must make every rea-
sonable attempt to convey his [or her] interest in the job to the em-
ployer before he or she may prevail on a discrimination
claim. . . . Here, Lunceford did not make every reasonable attempt to
convey his interest.  He did not apply for the position . . . .”88  Ulti-
mately, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judg-
ment, holding the EEOC did not establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination.89
III. ANALYSIS
The Eighth Circuit’s holding suggests that if the discrimination is
not “gross and pervasive,” an employee’s failure to apply will preclude
him or her from establishing a prima facie case of discrimination un-
less he or she makes every reasonable effort to convey his or her inter-
est in the position.90  The Eighth Circuit implies that every reasonable
effort means actual application, thereby obscuring whether an em-
85. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 367.
86. Audrain, 756 F.3d at 1087 (referencing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 367–68, 328–31).
87. Id. (quoting Lockridge v. Bd. of Trs., of the Univ. of Ark., 315 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th
Cir. 2003) (en banc)) (citing Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d
343, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2001); Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 711 (2d
Cir. 1998); Craik v. Minn. State Univ. Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 469–70 (8th Cir. 1984)).
88. Id. (quoting Lockridge, 315 F.3d at 1011; Chambers v. Wynne Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d
1214, 1217 (8th Cir. 1990)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Jackson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 643 F.3d 1081, 1086 (8th
Cir. 2011)).  The EEOC suggested men were the class in Audrain because Brooks
acknowledged her refusal to consider Lunceford was based on his gender, not his
qualifications.  Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 68, at *30–31.
89. Audrain, 756 F.3d at 1087.  After meeting with Lunceford regarding Brooks’ com-
ment that she wanted to hire a woman for the position, Audrain’s Director of
Human Resources stated that during her meeting with Lunceford, she did not
believe he was expressing an interest in the OR position and instead believed he
was merely advising her he was upset after his conversation with Brooks.  A sin-
gle conversation does not amount to every reasonable effort. Id. at 1087–88.
90. The every reasonable effort standard applies regardless of whether the position is
posted.  In Audrain the vacant position was posted, so this Note focuses on the
third exception.
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ployee in the Eighth Circuit has a remedy under Title VII for isolated
incidents of discrimination that deter him or her from applying for a
position.91  This holding begs the question of what the court means by
“every reasonable effort” when the position is posted and the employee
is deterred from applying.
In the same vein, is it reasonable to require an employee to “sub-
ject themselves to the humiliation of explicit and certain rejection”92
after being told by the relevant decision maker that his or her pro-
tected class would not be considered for a position, regardless of
qualifications?
A. The Eighth Circuit Wrongly Circumvented the Direct
Evidence Discussion
Direct evidence is “evidence showing a specific link between the
alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient
to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate
criterion actually motivated the adverse employment action.”93  The
relevant inquiry is “whether the [decision maker’s] statements lead to
the conclusion that the adverse action was taken because of the per-
son’s protected status without inference or presumption.”94  Direct ev-
idence “most often comprises remarks by decisionmakers that reflect
without inference, a discriminatory bias.”95  Direct evidence includes
“proof of an admission that gender was the reason for an action.”96
91. Audrain, 756 F.3d at 1087.
92. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365 (1977).
93. McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sci., 559 F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 2009) (quot-
ing Russell v. City of Kansas City, Mo., 414 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2007) (inter-
nal citations omitted)).
94. EEOC v. Lehi Roller Mills Co., No. 2:08–CV–00591, 2014 WL 1757987, at *1 (D.
Utah May 1, 2014).
95. McCullough, 559 F.3d at 861; see also Ducksworth v. St. Louis Metro. Police
Dept., 491 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding “I believe there is a definite need for
female officers on the night watch,” followed by the reassignment of only females
to the night watch, along with an admission by the defendants that “[a]ppellees’
gender was the reason they were involuntarily assigned to the night watch,” con-
stituted direct evidence of gender discrimination).  It is hard to reconcile Duck-
sworth with Audrain, because in both cases the employers made explicit
comments linking gender to the subsequent action and admitted that gender was
the only factor they considered, yet the comment in Ducksworth constituted di-
rect evidence and the comment in Audrain did not.
96. Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc., 178 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 1999).  In Audrain,
Brooks acknowledged that gender was the only factor she considered during her
conversation with Lunceford.  Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 68, at
*10.  It is surprising the Eighth Circuit did not find this to be “proof of an admis-
sion that gender was the reason for the action.” Kerns, 178 F.3d at 1017.
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In Audrain, the relevant decision maker told Lunceford that “she
wanted to fill the position with a woman.”97  The district court stated:
It cannot be disputed that Brooks’ remark that she wanted to hire a woman
for the position indicates a discriminatory bias to hire a woman . . . instead of
a man.  It is also undisputed that this remark involved a decisionmaker dis-
cussing the vacant job at issue.  None of the EEOC’s proof, however, estab-
lishes a direct link between the decision to hire someone else for the vacant
OR nurse position and Brooks’ remark.98
The EEOC’s brief pointed out that the district court’s reasoning
was counterintuitive because in acknowledging Brooks was biased
against men and would not have selected one regardless of qualifica-
tions, it conceded there was clearly a connection between Brooks’ bias
against men and her decision to hire a woman.99  In other words, the
EEOC did not think an inference was required to draw this conclu-
sion.  The Eighth Circuit declined to review this finding,100 which
forced the EEOC to prove an inference of discrimination under the
McDonnell Douglas framework.  The Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that
the statement did not constitute direct evidence is flawed when con-
sidered in conjunction with past precedent.
The court in Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc.101 stated that direct
evidence might include “proof of an admission that gender was the
reason for an action, discriminatory references to the particular em-
ployee in a work context, or stated hostility to [a specific gender] being
in the workplace at all.”102  In Audrain, Brooks’ admission that she
97. EEOC v. Audrain Health Care, Inc., No. 2:11–CV–57, 2013 WL 317311, at *3
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 28, 2013).
98. Id. at *5.
99. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 68, at *30.  “Indeed, since Lunceford is
a man and Brooks would not hire a man, she necessarily would have had to hire
someone else. . . . [A] jury could . . . [conclude] that Brooks did exactly what she
announced she was going to do—fill the position with a woman, rather than a
man.” Id.
100. EEOC v. Audrain Health Care, Inc., 756 F.3d 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 2014).
101. 178 F.3d 1011.
102. Id. at 1017 (emphasis added); see also Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-
Mo., Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 634-35 (8th Cir. 1998) (involving a case where the princi-
pal decision maker called an employee “that white boy,” and the court held the
comment “did not simply evidence an awareness of the employee’s gender or race,
it reveal[ed] a decidedly negative attitude toward [white] people on the part of [a
person] responsible for [the employment decision].”); Rivers-Frison v. Se. Mo.
Cmty. Treatment Ctr., 133 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1998) (discussing the distinc-
tion between “[c]omments which demonstrate a ‘discriminatory animus in the de-
cisional process’ or those uttered by individuals closely involved in employment
decisions,” from ‘stray remarks in the workplace,’ ‘statements by nondeci-
sionmakers,’ or ‘statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional pro-
cess.’”); Stacks v. Sw. Bell, 27 F.3d 1316, 1324 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Not all comments
that reflect a discriminatory attitude will support an inference that an illegiti-
mate criterion was a motivating factor in an employment decision.  Hudson’s
comment that ‘women were the worst thing’ that ever happened to the com-
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would not consider a man for the position, whether qualified or not,
appears to be a “stated hostility” to men working in the OR at all.103
In McDermott v. Lehman,104 the plaintiff, a fifty-five-year-old engi-
neer, inquired about an open Navy mechanical engineering position
and was told by the decision maker that he was looking to hire a
young engineer.105  The Maine court found that the statement was di-
rect evidence of discrimination. The court explained that the
employer:
[E]ither rejected Plaintiff because of his age or deterred him from applying
because of his age.  Under these circumstances, it is unnecessary to rigidly
hold Plaintiff to proof of the elements of a prima facie case.  Plaintiff need not
have completed the formal application if it would have been futile for him to
have done so.106
It further held that there was still a question of fact as to whether
the Plaintiff’s failure to further pursue the position was caused by the
decision maker’s comment or the plaintiff’s own lack of interest.107
Because the “resolution of these issues of fact [was] essential to [the]
determination of this case,” the court denied the employer’s summary
judgment motion and remanded the case.108  In Audrain, the Eighth
Circuit could have done the same by remanding the case to allow a
jury to determine whether Brooks’ discrimination or Lunceford’s lack
of interest caused Lunceford not to apply.
Similarly in Scheick v. Tecumseh Public Schools,109 the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that summary judgment was improper where there was di-
rect evidence of discrimination.  There, a superintendent told a high
school principal “they just want[ed] somebody younger,” before mak-
ing the decision not to renew the fifty-six-year-old’s contract.  The
Sixth Circuit’s decision was unaffected by the fact that the school had
evidence that its decision was actually based on complaints about the
principal’s performance and “lack of leadership.”110  In Perry v.
Kunz,111 the Eighth Circuit concluded that statements by a decision
maker that the plaintiff would be selected for lay-off because of her
pany . . . warrants such an inference, even though it was not made during the
decisional process.”).
103. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 68, at *30.
104. 594 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Me. 1984).
105. The plaintiff asked if it made much of a difference that he was older, to which the
employer responded he thought so because a couple of older engineers would soon
be retiring, so they wanted a younger engineer to take their place. Id.
106. Id.; see Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365–67 (1977).
107. McDermott, 594 F. Supp. at 1323 (“This testimony and other statements made by
Plaintiff constitute direct evidence that Defendant’s employee . . . either rejected
Plaintiff because of his age or deterred him from applying because of his age.”).
108. Id.
109. No. 13-1558, 2014 WL 4403175 (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 2014).
110. Id. at *5–6.  The court remanded to determine whether age was the “but-for”
cause of the employer’s allegedly discriminatory decision. Id.
111. 878 F.2d 1056 (8th Cir. 1989).
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age, if believed, constituted direct evidence of discrimination.112  Both
Scheick and Perry illustrate that a statement far less blatant than
Brooks’ statement in Audrain can be considered direct evidence, sug-
gesting the Eighth Circuit erred in concluding otherwise.
In EEOC v. Lehi Roller Mills Co., Inc.,113 when putting the plain-
tiff on leave, the employer told the plaintiff he was “getting old,” and
that the company wanted younger employees with new ideas.114  The
Utah court noted that when determining if a statement constituted
direct evidence the relevant inquiry is “whether the statements lead to
the conclusion that the adverse action was taken because of the per-
son’s protected status without inference or presumption.”115  The
court stated that “[h]ere, if proven at trial, the statements Plaintiffs
allege were made constitute direct evidence of discriminatory motive
under the ADEA because they were made in temporal proximity to his
termination and were made by a decision maker to [plaintiff] . . . .”116
The court denied summary judgment because there was direct evi-
dence of discriminatory motive.117
The Eighth Circuit did not review whether Brooks’ statement con-
stituted direct evidence, instead focusing on whether there was an ad-
verse employment action.  The Eighth Circuit could have concluded
the adverse employment action in Audrain was the decision maker’s
refusal to consider any man for the open position, regardless of qualifi-
cations.118  Lunceford was denied the opportunity to compete for the
open position.  If being denied the opportunity to compete constituted
an adverse employment action, then the Eighth Circuit could have
concluded Brooks’ statement that she wanted to fill the OR position
with a woman was direct evidence of discriminatory motive.  This
would have allowed Lunceford to proceed using a mixed-motives anal-
ysis.  Under this analysis, if Lunceford could prove his gender was a
motivating factor, then he could recover from Audrain, regardless of
Audrain’s nondiscriminatory justifications.
B. “Reverse Discrimination”: The (White) Elephant in the
Room
Reverse discrimination claims involve plaintiffs from groups that
have been favored historically, such as whites and males.119  When
112. Id. at 1058-60.
113. 2:08–CV–00591, 2014 WL 1757987 (D. Utah May 1, 2014).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. Someone older replaced the plaintiff, but the court pointed out that replace-
ment by someone younger is not a required element of the prima facie case. Id. at
*2.
118. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 68, at *14.
119. LINDEMANN ET AL., supra note 68, at 2–28.
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establishing a prima facie case of reverse discrimination, some courts
impose upon the plaintiff the additional burden of proving background
circumstances sufficient to raise the inference that the employer is the
unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.120  The ra-
tionale is that because the plaintiff was not historically discriminated
against, “an inference of discrimination should not automatically ap-
ply where the employer takes action benefitting another group.”121
There are two types of evidence that can be used to satisfy the
“background circumstances” test: (1) “evidence indicating that the
particular employer at issue has some reason or inclination to discrim-
inate invidiously against [the majority]” and (2) “evidence indicating
that there is something ‘fishy’ about the facts of the case at hand that
raises an inference of discrimination.”122  “An expression of an inter-
est in hiring a female by the person in charge of hiring” is sufficient to
satisfy the background circumstances analysis.123
In Mills v. Health Care Service Corp.,124 after an assistant man-
ager position was created, the plaintiff, a white male, and three fe-
males applied for the position.125  The employer ultimately hired a
female.126  The plaintiff brought suit alleging gender discrimination
in violation of Title VII.  The district court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant after concluding that the plaintiff could
not establish that the employer’s proffered reasons for not promoting
the plaintiff were pretextual.127  The Seventh Circuit analyzed the
claim for discrimination brought by a majority plaintiff under the Mc-
Donnell Douglas framework.128  The court replaced the first prong of
the McDonnell Douglas framework with a “background circum-
stances” test, which required the plaintiff to show sufficient “back-
ground circumstances which give rise to an inference of
120. Susan C. Thies, Comment, Mills v. Health Care Service Corporation: Are “Back-
ground Circumstances” Too Much to Ask of a Plaintiff Alleging Reverse Discrimi-
nation in Employment?, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 537, 550 (Spring 2000).
121. Id. at n.103.
122. Id. at 550–51 (citing Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d. 150, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
123. Id. at 551 (citing Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026, 1037 (8th Cir. 1997), abrogated
by Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d. 1031 (2011)).  The Duffy Court stated
that interest in hiring a female, evidence of the plaintiff’s superior qualifications,
and evidence of other female hires were all “background circumstances.” Duffy,
123 F.3d at 1036–37.  The Plaintiff was “statutorily exempt from bringing a claim
under Title VII.” Id. at 1036 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2012)).  The plaintiff
instead brought a Bivens action, but the court still applied the “background cir-
cumstances” test as a replacement for the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas
framework. Id. at 1036–37.
124. 171 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 1999).
125. Id. at 453.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 453–54.
128. Id. at 545–55.
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discrimination. . . . to overcome the background presumption that a
white man was not subject to employment discrimination.”129
Although not mentioned in Audrain, the Eighth Circuit has
adopted the background circumstances test.130  In McGinnis v. Union
Pacific Railroad,131 the Eighth Circuit applied the background cir-
cumstances test and rejected the male plaintiff’s gender discrimina-
tion claim on the grounds that at the time he was terminated, 82% of
the train dispatchers were men.132
Men, especially white men, have not been historically discrimi-
nated against and, therefore, courts hold them to a higher burden of
proof and potentially presume an absence of discrimination.133  Be-
cause Audrain was not the “unusual employer who discriminates
against [men],” it is probable that Lunceford was fighting an uphill
battle in establishing his prima facie case of gender discrimination.134
C. Failure-to-Apply—An Employer’s Free Pass Under the
McDonnell Douglas Framework
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework a plaintiff must show:
(1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected group; (2) the plaintiff ap-
plied and was qualified for the position for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (3) despite the plaintiff’s qualifications, the em-
ployer rejected the plaintiff; and (4) after the plaintiff’s rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons possessing the plaintiff’s qualifications.135  “The prima
facie case serves an important function in litigation: it eliminates the
most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff’s rejec-
tion.”136  The prima facie proof required for Title VII litigation is not
immutable.  In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Court stated
“[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specifica-
129. Id. at 457; see also Thies, supra note 120, at 543 n.28 (concluding the fact that the
employer disproportionately promoted women during the seven years the plain-
tiff was employed constituted sufficient background circumstances for the court).
130. McGinnis v. Union Pac. R.R., 496 F.3d 868, 875 (8th Cir. 2007) (“To establish the
first prong of his prima facie case, McGinnis must show Union Pacific is the unu-
sual employer who discriminates against the majority because McGinnis is a
man.”).
131. Id.
132. Id. The court also noted other reasons, such as the plaintiff’s rule violations and
failure to pass the apprentice training course. Id.
133. Thies, supra note 120, at 553–54 (“By requiring a greater degree of proof from
some plaintiffs and not others, the ‘background circumstances’ test violates the
intent of the neutral language in Title VII.”).
134. Looking at the facts of Audrain, the Eighth Circuit, possibly presuming
Lunceford was not discriminated against, may have made its decision long before
it reached the adverse employment action issue.
135. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
136. Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253–54 (1981).
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tion . . . of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not neces-
sarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.”137
This discussion will focus on the application requirement because the
Audrain decision centered on the plaintiff’s lack of application.
To make a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work, the plaintiff must apply for the position in question.138  The ap-
plication requirement is a protectionist tool for the employer.  Actual
application allows the employer the opportunity to consider the appli-
cant and then make an informed decision.139  But how does this ratio-
nale stand up in cases like Audrain, where the protectionist purpose is
extraneous because the decision maker made her decision regarding
the applicant prior to actual application?
In Audrain, Brooks’ statement that she would not consider men for
the position was so explicit that it deterred Lunceford from applying,
thereby preventing him from making his prima facie case under the
McDonnell Douglas framework.  The Eighth Circuit held that because
Lunceford did not apply, he was not denied the position and therefore
there was no adverse employment action.  Following this rationale, if
an employer’s comments are discriminatory enough to deter an appli-
cant from applying, then the employer has a free pass under the Mc-
Donnell Douglas framework in the Eighth Circuit.  The McDonnell
Douglas framework “is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading re-
quirement. . . . [It] should not be transposed into a rigid pleading stan-
dard for discrimination cases.”140  In Audrain, the Eighth Circuit
should have overlooked the application requirement because failing to
do so absolved Audrain of liability at Lunceford’s expense.
D. Every Reasonable (Ambitious) Effort
“Reasonable” means “[f]air, proper, or moderate under the circum-
stances.”141  But scholars have noted “[i]t is extremely difficult to
state what lawyers [or judges] mean when they speak of ‘reasonable-
ness.’”142  By its definition, reasonableness does not mean extreme ef-
forts.  After Audrain, however, it appears that in failure-to-apply
137. McDonnell Douglas Corp, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
138. Id. at 802; see, e.g., Lockridge v. Bd. of Trs., of the Univ. of Ark., 315 F.3d 1005,
1010 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc).  Typically the employee must show that “she ap-
plied . . . and was rejected.” Id.
139. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
140. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510, 512 (2002).
141. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1456 (9th ed. 2009).
142. John Salmond, JURISPRUDENCE 183 n.(u) (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed.
1947).
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cases, an employee will not be excused from applying unless his or her
efforts are ambitious and relentless.143
This ambitious-reasonable standard has not always been the rule
in the Eighth Circuit.  In Easley v. Empire Inc.,144 the court noted that
it will excuse failure to submit a formal application “when a known
discriminatory policy, such as reflected by the statements [of two man-
agers that ‘men do not like to take orders from women’] deters poten-
tial jobseekers” such as the plaintiff, a woman.145  Explaining this
exception, the court later stated “[i]t would be ironic—bizarre, in
fact—if a victim of discrimination were unable to vindicate her rights
because she had the peculiar misfortune of being discriminated
against in a way that necessarily prevented her from making her
prima facie case.”146  It should be noted that the plaintiff in Easley
inquired on several occasions about the vacant position.147  It seems
likely this persistence led the Eighth Circuit to excuse the formal ap-
plication as futile.  The court emphasized Easley’s multiple inquiries
and the fact she was more qualified for the position than the man who
ultimately received the job.148  The employer argued Easley failed to
make her prima facie case in part because she did not prove that she
applied for or was qualified for the position.149  The Eighth Circuit
categorically rejected this argument, stating:
The Supreme Court has warned against excessive quibbling over the prima
facie case after the defendant has proceeded with evidence of a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for the challenged personnel decision.  The purpose of
the prima facie case, that of airing the most common reasons why applicants
are not hired, will have been met, and those concerns will have merged into
the ultimate issue of the case—whether the applicant was treated less favora-
bly because of sex.150
Although the court did not reach the prima facie case issue, it
noted formal application would be excused here because of the super-
visor’s statements.151  The Eighth Circuit was also quick to point out
that the plaintiff need only show that his or her qualifications “fell
143. Although the Eighth Circuit stated that absent application a plaintiff must make
every reasonable attempt to convey his or her interest in the position, the court
implied that every reasonable attempt means actual application.
144. 757 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1985).
145. Id. at 930 n.7.  The plaintiff told her supervisor she would like to apply for the
position of retail manager, to which her employer responded, “You know men do
not like to take orders from women.” Id. The plaintiff’s supervisor’s supervisor
later repeated this comment. Id.
146. Shannon v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.3d 678, 682 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367 (1977)).
147. Easley, 757 F.2d at 930.
148. Id. at 931.
149. Id. at 929.
150. Id. at 929–30 (citations omitted).
151. Id. at 930 n.7 (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
363–68) (noting that following a showing of class-wide discrimination, a nonap-
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within general range of qualifications possessed by other persons con-
sidered for the job.”152  Said otherwise, the plaintiff would not have to
show that her qualifications were the same or better than the other
applicants, just in the general range.  The Court ultimately sided with
the plaintiff,153 finding the employer’s explanation for failing to con-
sider her for the position was largely pretextual, and this type of gen-
der discrimination was the employer’s “general policy and
practice.”154  Lunceford, unlike Easley, only inquired about the open
OR position once.  This distinction could very well have been what
doomed Lunceford.
 Easley can be contrasted with Culpepper v. Vilsack,155 where the
court held that the plaintiff did not make every reasonable effort to
convey her interest in the position.156  In Culpepper, the plaintiff, a
hearing-impaired employee, claimed the district court erred in failing
to excuse as futile her failure to apply for the loan specialist position,
and erred in failing to find discrimination when the announcement
referred to “listening.”157  The plaintiff argued her failure to apply for
the loan specialist position should have been excused because of the
history of discrimination against her158 and the inclusion of the dis-
criminatory “listening experience” language in the announcement.159
Culpepper’s assertion of futility ultimately failed because the lower
plicant member of the class is entitled to show that the discriminatory policies
deterred him from applying).
152. Id. at 930 n.8 (discussing the fact that a company chose a better qualified appli-
cant aids the employer’s burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its employment decision, not the plaintiff’s prima facie case); see also
United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983) (re-
counting how the Supreme Court stated the ultimate issue is whether the fact
finder may conclude that the plaintiff’s qualifications were not the real motiva-
tion for the personnel decision).
153. Easley, 757 F.2d at 932.  The court discussed how plaintiff’s success should dispel
the “discriminatory atmosphere” at the company and also noted the district
court’s idea that plaintiff’s suit “would deter future overt, intentional discrimina-
tion.” Id.
154. Id. at 931.  Nine out of about 300 retail managers were women, and four of them
were hired after plaintiff’s discharge.  Additionally, the employer’s policy manual
stated, “Past experience has proven that a male Office Manager generally is bet-
ter qualified to perform these required duties; and therefore, it is recommended
that a male applicant be hired if possible.” Id.
155. 664 F.3d 252 (8th Cir. 2011) (involving a case where the plaintiff brought an ac-
tion against the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture for
workplace discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C.S. § 701 (2012)).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 256–57 (noting the job announcement referred to “successful activity/expe-
rience in listening”).
158. Id. at 255 (discussing the multiple complaints that the plaintiff filed with the
USDA over the course of her employment).
159. Id. at 257.
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court found the recent death of her father—not discrimination—de-
terred her from applying.160  The Eighth Circuit left this finding
undisturbed.161
The plaintiff also claimed that after the “listening” language was
removed, the USDA continued to discriminate against her by not pro-
moting her through the accretion-of-duties process.162  The accretion-
of-duties process is a noncompetitive promotion process where em-
ployees working above their grade level can ask to have their grade
level reclassified to reflect the level at which they are actually per-
forming.163  Either the employer or employee can initiate the accre-
tion-of-duties promotion by requesting a desk audit; however,
Culpepper did not request a desk audit or request that her employer
do so.164  The plaintiff never applied for an accretion-of-duties promo-
tion, and the Eighth Circuit held she did not make every reasonable
effort to convey her interest in the promotion to her employer, thus
foreclosing the possibility of relief.165
Audrain falls somewhere between Easley and Culpepper.
Lunceford did not inquire about the OR position as persistently as the
plaintiff in Easley, but he did at least inquire about the position, un-
like the plaintiff in Culpepper. Audrain appears to be more like Eas-
ley than Culpepper.  Therefore, the Eighth Circuit should have denied
Audrain’s motion for summary judgment.
The Fifth Circuit in Hailes v. United Air Lines166 used a different
standard.  In Hailes, United Air Lines (United) placed an advertise-
ment in the newspaper for stewardesses under the “Help Wanted—
Females” column, and Hailes, a man, filed a Title VII lawsuit alleging
gender discrimination.167  Hailes never applied for the position, nor
did he communicate in any way with United.168  The court first con-
sidered whether Hailes was an “aggrieved” person under the Act.169
The Hailes court found that “the types of advertisements sought to be
proscribed by this subsection are those, which by their expression of
preference for one sex, effectively inhibit members of the opposite sex
from seeking employment with the company inserting the advertise-
ment.”170  United argued that because Hailes did not apply, he could
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.  Culpepper did not make any attempt, let alone a reasonable one.
165. Id. at 257–58.
166. 464 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1972).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1008.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e) (2012).
170. Hailes, 464 F.2d at 1008.
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not be aggrieved.171  The court rejected this proposition stating, “[t]he
very appearance at an employer’s offices of one who had read the dis-
criminatory ad but nevertheless continued to seek the job, would
demonstrate that the reader was not deterred by this unlawful prac-
tice and therefore not aggrieved.”172
The Fifth Circuit refused to hold that a “mere casual reader” of an
advertisement could bring suit, instead finding that “[t]o be aggrieved
under this subsection a person must be able to demonstrate that he
has a real, present interest in the type of employment advertised.  In
addition, that person must be able to show he was effectively deterred
by the improper ad from applying for such position.”173  The court held
that whether Hailes was reasonably deterred from seeking the posi-
tion in violation of Title VII was a question for the trial court.174
By requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate a “real, present interest”
in the position, the court showed that the pool of potential futile-ges-
ture plaintiffs is not unlimited.  This standard would have helped
Lunceford in Audrain and alleviated any concern the Eighth Circuit
may have had about opening the floodgates in failure–to-apply cases.
As an illustration, in Audrain, Lunceford would be an aggrieved per-
son because he expressed a “real, present interest” in the open OR
position, whereas another male nurse in the OR who heard Brooks’
statement would not.  Because the Eighth Circuit did not use this ap-
proach, future plaintiffs are subject to the ambiguous and ambitious
“every reasonable effort” standard.
E. The Legal Landscape After Audrain
In the Eighth Circuit, under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
an employee is excused from applying when: (1) he can show that ab-
sent “gross and pervasive” discrimination he would have applied;175
(2) the position was not posted, and he made every reasonable effort to
convey to the employer his interest in the position;176 or (3) the posi-
tion is officially posted, but instead of applying he made every reason-
able effort to convey to the employer his interest in the position.177
171. Id.
172. Id. (“Thus, if we were to hold that Hailes cannot challenge this advertisement,
then nobody could ever complain of this practice which Congress has so directly
proscribed.”).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1009.
175. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367 (1977).  After estab-
lishing a pattern or practice of discrimination, a class member plaintiff who failed
to apply has the opportunity to prove that he or she would have applied if the
discrimination was not present. Id.
176. Chambers v. Wynne Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d 1214, 1217 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing EEOC
v. Metal Serv. Co., 829 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir. 1990)).
177. EEOC v. Audrain Health Care, Inc., 756 F.3d 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 2014).
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Stated differently, the plaintiff must show that he made “every rea-
sonable effort” whether or not the position was posted.  This third cat-
egory is rather questionable considering precedent, which applies the
every reasonable effort test only when the position was not officially
advertised.178  Yet, the Eighth Circuit discussed whether Lunceford
made every reasonable effort in Audrain, where the position was
posted.179
Post-Audrain, the Eighth Circuit has left little guidance for future
plaintiffs that fail to apply.  First, Eighth Circuit precedent provides
no meaningful examples of “every reasonable effort.”  The Audrain
court suggested that actual application is the only way to meet the
standard.  This position automatically dooms any plaintiff who does
not apply, and renders the exception meaningless.  The Eighth Circuit
would have been more transparent by stating, “Lunceford you should
have applied, and because you did not, you cannot be afforded relief.”
The peculiar facts in Audrain could be part of the reason the court
came to its conclusion.180  The Eighth Circuit may have intended the
holding to be exclusive to the facts.  However, by failing to include a
caveat saying as much, the court passively accepted isolated instances
of discrimination by implying the court would not excuse failure to
apply unless and until a pattern or practice of discrimination was
established.
The Supreme Court in Teamsters recognized the need for a failure-
to-apply exception and noted that “[i]f an employer should announce
his policy of discrimination by a sign reading ‘Whites Only’ on the hir-
ing office door, his victims would not be limited to the few who ignored
the sign and subjected themselves to personal rebuffs.”181  Likewise in
Audrain, the employer announced her policy to discriminate against
men verbally.182  The Teamsters Court found that a sign reading
“Whites Only” amounted to a pattern or practice of discrimination.183
This begs the question: Why did the Eighth Circuit not find the same?
One possible rationale is a sign on the door is more notorious than
a statement made to a single class member within earshot of two
178. It is possible the court distinguishes between advertised and unadvertised posi-
tions because advertised positions provide extrinsic evidence that the employee
had reason to be aware of the open position.
179. Audrain, 756 F.3d at 1087–88.
180. The plaintiff was a white male and Brooks’ comment was blatantly discrimina-
tory, whereas in other failure-to-apply cases the employer’s comments required a
more strenuous inference of discrimination. Compare Easley v. Empire Inc., 757
F.2d 923, 930 (8th Cir. 1985) (“You know men do not like to take orders from
women.”), with Audrain, 756 F.3d at 1085.
181. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365 (1977).  The failure-to-
apply exception is predicated upon the existence of a pattern or practice of “gross
and pervasive” discrimination. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
182. Audrain, 756 F.3d 1083.
183. Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324.
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others.  Perhaps the more notorious the statement, the more likely ex-
cluded persons would be deterred from applying, and therefore be vic-
tims of discrimination.  However, this ignores the purpose of Title VII,
which is to protect individual plaintiffs who are members of a pro-
tected class from discrimination.  Further, it would require multiple
individuals to be affected before Title VII protection becomes availa-
ble.  The statement made in Audrain, if advertised on a door, would
amount to a pattern or practice of discrimination, yet the court
reached a conclusion contrary to Teamsters because only two people
heard it.  This case would have been the perfect opportunity for the
court to articulate a narrow gateway to relief for plaintiffs who, in the
absence of “gross and pervasive” discrimination, are deterred from ap-
plying for a position because of an employer’s blatantly discriminatory
statement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Forcing plaintiffs to apply for a position after they have already
been rejected is humiliating.  When the Eighth Circuit tells Gary he
should have applied at the law firm irrespective of Sally’s comments,
he will likely feel degraded.  The failure-to-apply exception was once a
useful tool for plaintiffs who, because of “gross and pervasive” discrim-
ination, were deterred from applying for a position in which they
would have otherwise been interested.  The failure-to-apply exception
could have saved Gary additional embarrassment by not requiring
him to go through the motions of applying, when he knew he would be
denied the job.  However, after Audrain, a plaintiff in the Eighth Cir-
cuit should not rely on the exception unless there is a very clear pat-
tern or practice of discrimination.
In Audrain, the plaintiff only alleged that Brooks’ statement was
direct evidence, and that the court should excuse the plaintiff’s failure
to apply as futile.  The Eighth Circuit did not review the lower court’s
holding that the statement was direct evidence, instead focusing on
the fact that because the plaintiff did not apply, there was no adverse
employment action.  For the reasons outlined above, the Eighth Cir-
cuit erred in not concluding the statement was direct evidence.  Be-
cause the court construed the causation aspect of direct evidence
narrowly, future plaintiffs should expand their complaints to include
sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment under the McDon-
nell Douglas framework as well.
The Audrain opinion rested on the fact that there was no adverse
employment action.  Future plaintiffs who do not apply for a position
cannot rely on the failure-to-apply exception.  Instead, they should al-
lege they were denied the opportunity to compete—this is the battle-
ground for future plaintiffs.  Being denied the opportunity to compete
satisfies the adverse employment action prong of McDonnell Douglas.
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Majority plaintiffs must also be cognizant of the presumption against
discrimination working against them and, therefore, would be wise to
allege background circumstances that support the proposition that
their employer is the unusual employer who discriminates against the
majority.  Future plaintiffs need to produce evidence they enthusiasti-
cally conveyed their interest in the position to the employer, absent
application.  A mere inquiry or statement of interest will likely not
suffice post-Audrain.
Although these alternative suggestions may help future plaintiffs,
the Audrain opinion and the volume of precedent in the Eighth Circuit
working against individual employees claiming discrimination indi-
cate future plaintiffs will face a hard road to success.
